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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case arises from a corporate reorganization under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. 
(the “Code”), and puts at issue whether a non-debtor 
company‟s decision to abandon its classification as an “S” 
corporation for federal tax purposes, thus forfeiting the pass-
through tax benefits that it and its debtor subsidiary had 
enjoyed, is void as a postpetition transfer of “property of the 
bankruptcy estate,” or is avoidable, under §§ 362, 549, and 
550 of the Code.  This appears to be a question of first 
impression in the federal Courts of Appeals.   
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 Barden Development, Inc. (“BDI”), John M. Chase, as 
the personal representative of the estate of Don H. Barden
1
 
(together with BDI, the “Barden Appellants”), and the 
Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) appeal an order of the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware 
granting summary judgment to The Majestic Star Casino, 
LLC and certain of its subsidiaries and affiliates (collectively 
“Majestic” or the “Debtors”) on their motion to avoid BDI‟s 
termination of its status as an “S” corporation (or “S-corp”), 
an entity type that is not subject to federal taxation.  In 
November 2009, the Debtors, which had been controlled by 
Barden, filed petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the 
Code.  After the bankruptcy filing, Barden, as sole 
shareholder of BDI, successfully petitioned the IRS to revoke 
BDI‟s S-corp status.  Under the Internal Revenue Code 
(“I.R.C.”), that revocation also caused Majestic Star Casino 
II, Inc. (“MSC II”), an indirect and wholly-owned BDI 
subsidiary and one of the Debtors, to lose its status as a 
qualified subchapter S subsidiary (or “QSub”), which meant 
that it, like BDI, became subject to federal taxation.   
 
The Debtors were by then effectively controlled by 
their creditors and, naturally, did not agree with shouldering a 
new tax burden.  They filed an adversary complaint asserting 
that the revocation of BDI‟s S-corp status caused an unlawful 
postpetition transfer of property of the MSC II bankruptcy 
estate.  The Bankruptcy Court agreed and ordered the Barden 
Appellants and the IRS to reinstate both BDI‟s status as an S-
                                              
1
 Don H. Barden died on May 19, 2011.  His personal 
representative was substituted for him in this action in July 
2011.  For simplicity, Don H. Barden and Mr. Chase are 
referred to in this opinion as “Barden.” 
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corp and MSC II‟s status as a QSub.  The case was certified 
to us for direct appeal.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
vacate the Bankruptcy Court‟s January 24, 2012 order and 
remand this matter to the Court with directions to dismiss the 
complaint. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Facts 
 
1. The Parties 
 
Defendant-Appellant BDI is an Indiana corporation 
with its headquarters in Detroit, Michigan.  Defendant-
Appellant Barden was, at all pertinent times, the sole 
shareholder, chief executive officer, and president of BDI.  At 
the time of the complaint, BDI qualified as a “small business 
corporation” under I.R.C. § 1361(b), and, presumably at 
Barden‟s direction, had elected under I.R.C. § 1362(a) to be 
treated as an S-corp for purposes of federal income taxation.  
As an S-corp, BDI was not subject to federal taxation, see 
I.R.C. § 1363(a),
2
 or state taxation.
3
  Rather, its income and 
                                              
2
 The Internal Revenue Code presumes that a business 
entity incorporated under any federal or state statute is taxable 
as a “C” corporation, the letter designation having reference 
to the subchapter of the I.R.C. which governs the tax 
treatment of various corporate transactions and interests.  See, 
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 331-346 (covering corporate liquidations); id. 
§§ 351-368 (corporate organizations and reorganizations); id. 
§ 385 (treatment of corporate interests as stock or 
indebtedness); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a), (b) (defining a 
business entity that is “recognized for federal tax purposes”).  
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losses were passed through to its shareholder, Barden, who 
was required to report BDI‟s income on his individual tax 
returns.  See I.R.C. §§ 1363(b), 1366(a).
4
  
                                                                                                     
Subchapter S of the I.R.C. creates an exception for a business 
entity that qualifies as a “small business corporation” and 
whose shareholder or shareholders elect S-corp status for that 
entity.  See I.R.C. § 1361(a) (providing that any corporation is 
a taxable C-corporation unless it qualifies for, and elects, S-
corp status); id. § 1362(a) (providing for the “S” election).  
To qualify as a small business corporation, the business entity 
must be a domestic corporation that does not have more than 
100 shareholders, has only individual persons as shareholders, 
does not have a nonresident alien as a shareholder, and has 
only a single class of stock.  Id. § 1361(b).  As discussed in 
more detail infra, an S-corp is a “disregarded entity” for 
federal tax purposes and is not taxed on its income.  Id. 
§ 1363(a); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(v)(C) 
(providing that an entity that elects S-corp status is treated as 
an “association” rather than as a corporation for tax purposes 
so that only its shareholders are taxed on the entity‟s income). 
3
 Indiana follows the federal entity classification rules 
for state tax purposes, so that an entity classified as an S-corp 
for federal tax purposes is automatically classified as such for 
Indiana state tax purposes.  Ind. Code Ann. § 6-3-2-2.8(2).   
BDI was therefore treated as a disregarded entity by Indiana 
tax authorities as well. 
4
 An S-corp is sometimes referred to as a “pass-
though” or “flow-through” entity because the entity itself 
pays no tax but its income, deductions, losses, and credits 
flow-through to its shareholders, who must report those 
amounts in their personal income tax returns.  United States v. 
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Plaintiff-Appellee MSC II is a Delaware corporation 
that owns and operates the Majestic Star II Casino and the 
Majestic Star Hotel in Gary, Indiana.  MSC II generates 
income from those operations.  BDI acquired MSC II in 2005 
and was, at all times relevant to this dispute, the ultimate 
owner of 100 percent of its stock.
5
  Prior to the Debtors‟ 
bankruptcy petition, BDI elected to treat MSC II as a QSub 
for federal tax purposes, pursuant to I.R.C. § 1361(b)(3)(B).
6
  
                                                                                                     
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 576 n.14 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).    
5
 MSC II was a wholly-owned subsidiary of The 
Majestic Star Casino, LLC, which in turn was wholly-owned 
by Majestic Holdco, LLC.  BDI owned 100 percent of the 
stock of  Majestic Holdco, LLC.  Due to the 100 percent 
tiered ownership of Majestic Holdco, LLC and The Majestic 
Star Casino, LLC, those intermediate subsidiaries are treated 
as “disregarded entities” for federal income tax purposes, see 
Treas. Reg. § 307.7701-3(b)(ii), and BDI is treated as the 
owner of MSC II.    
6
 The 1996 amendments to the I.R.C. enacted as part of 
the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, introduced QSubs as a new tax 
entity.  An S-corp may elect QSub status for its subsidiary if 
(1) the S-corp parent holds 100 percent of the subsidiary‟s 
stock, (2) the subsidiary is otherwise eligible to qualify as an 
S-corp on its own, but for the fact that it has a corporate 
shareholder, and (3) the S-corp parent makes the appropriate 
election on IRS Form 8869.  See generally The S Corporation 
Handbook § 2:6 (Peter M. Fass & Barbara S. Gerrard, eds. 
2012).  Treasury regulations provide that a QSub is generally 
not treated as a corporation separate from its S-corp  parent.  
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That meant that MSC II was not treated as a separate tax 
entity from BDI, but rather that all of its assets, liabilities, and 
income were treated for federal tax purposes as the assets, 
liabilities, and income of BDI.  See id. § 1361(b)(3)(A).  As a 
result, MSC II paid no federal taxes and all of its income and 
losses flowed through to Barden (through BDI), and he was 
required to report them on his individual tax returns.  See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-1(a).  BDI was able to elect to treat 
MSC II as a QSub because the latter met the statutory 
requirement that it was wholly owned by an S-corp, 
ultimately  BDI.  See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(3)(B); supra notes 5 
and 6.       
 
2. The Majestic Bankruptcy and the  
 Revocation of MSC II’s QSub Status 
 
On November 23, 2009 (the “Petition Date”), MSC II 
and the other Debtors filed voluntary petitions for bankruptcy 
relief under the Code, and the Bankruptcy Court subsequently 
ordered that their Chapter 11 cases be jointly administered.  
The Debtors became debtors-in-possession of their respective 
                                                                                                     
Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-4(a)(1).  If an S-corp makes a valid 
QSub election with respect to an existing subsidiary, as in this 
case, the subsidiary is deemed to have liquidated into the 
parent under I.R.C. §§ 332 and 337.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-
4(a)(2).  If a subsidiary ceases to qualify as a QSub – for 
example, because its corporate parent is no longer an S-corp – 
the subsidiary is treated as a new corporation acquiring all of 
its assets (and assuming all of its liabilities) from the parent 
S-corp immediately before termination, in exchange for stock 
of the new subsidiary corporation, under I.R.C. § 351.  I.R.C. 
§ 1361(b)(3)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-5(b).       
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bankruptcy estates, and thus had, with limited exceptions not 
relevant here, all of the powers and duties of a bankruptcy 
trustee in a Chapter 11 case.  At the Petition Date, both BDI 
and MSC II retained their status as, respectively, an S-corp 
and a QSub.  Barden and BDI did not file  bankruptcy 
petitions, nor did they participate as debtors in any of the 
petitions at issue in this case.   
 
In addition to certain events that automatically revoke 
an entity‟s election to be treated as an S-corp,7 that tax status 
may also be revoked if more than half of the corporation‟s 
shareholders consent to the revocation.  I.R.C. 
§ 1362(d)(1)(B).  If S-corp status is revoked, the entity cannot 
elect such status again within five years of the revocation 
without the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury.  Id. 
§ 1362(g).
8
 
 
Sometime after the Petition Date, Barden, BDI‟s sole 
shareholder, caused and consented to the revocation of BDI‟s 
                                              
7
 Those events include the purchase of the company‟s 
stock by more than 100 shareholders, by a shareholder who is 
not a natural person, or by a shareholder who is a nonresident 
alien, I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A)-(C), or the company‟s issuance 
of more than one class of stock, id. § 1361(b)(1)(D).  Any of 
those events cause the S-corp to lose its required status as a 
“small business corporation.”   
8
 Like an S-corp that elects to revoke or otherwise 
loses its S-corp status, see I.R.C. § 1362(g), a QSub that loses 
its QSub status is not eligible for that status again for five 
years, without the consent of the Secreatary or the IRS, id. 
§ 1361(b)(3)(D); Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-5(c)(1). 
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status as an S-corp, and BDI filed a notice with the IRS to 
that effect.  The revocation was retroactively effective to 
January 1, 2010, the first day of BDI‟s taxable year.9  As a 
result, MSC II‟s QSub status was automatically terminated as 
of the end of the prior tax year (the “Revocation”), because it 
no longer met the requirement that it be wholly owned by an 
S-corp.  Thus, both BDI and MSC II became C-corporations 
as of January 1, 2010.  As a consequence of becoming a C-
corporation, MSC II became responsible for filing its own tax 
returns and paying income taxes on its holdings and 
operations.     
 
Neither BDI nor Barden sought or obtained 
authorization from the Debtors or from the Bankruptcy Court 
for the Revocation.  The Debtors did not learn of the 
Revocation until July 19, 2010, which is believed to be at 
least four months after Barden and BDI filed the S-corp 
revocation with the IRS.  See supra note 9.  The Debtors 
allege that, because MSC II was not informed of the 
Revocation, it was unaware that it had a new obligation to 
report and pay income taxes. They also allege that, due to the 
change in MSC II‟s tax status, MSC II had to pay 
approximately $2.26 million in estimated income tax to the 
Indiana Department of Revenue for 2010 that it otherwise 
                                              
9
 It is not clear from the record at what point during the 
pendency of the Majestic bankruptcy proceedings BDI 
revoked its S-corp status.  However, it presumably did so 
before March 15, 2010, because the revocation was effective 
on the first day of 2010 and would otherwise have been 
effective on the first day of 2011.  See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(1)(C) 
(setting forth the effective dates for revocation of S-corp 
status). 
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would not have had to pay.  However, as of April 2011 (the 
first date federal taxes would have been due following the 
Revocation), the Debtors had paid no federal income taxes as 
a result of the Revocation.    
 
3. Confirmation of the Majestic Plan and  
 Its Effect on MSC II  
 
On December 10, 2010, prior to the Debtors‟ filing of 
the adversary complaint that initiated this action, the 
Bankruptcy Court issued an order permitting the Debtors to 
convert MSC II from a Delaware corporation to a Delaware 
limited liability company (“LLC”).  On March 10, 2011, the 
Court entered an order confirming the Debtors‟ Second 
Amended Plan of Reorganization (the “Plan”).  Pursuant to 
the Plan, as of December 1, 2011 (the “Effective Date”), new 
membership interests representing all of the equity interests in 
MSC II were to be issued to holders of certain senior secured 
debt.  On November 28, 2011, just prior to the Effective Date, 
the Debtors went ahead and caused MSC II to convert to an 
LLC.  That conversion meant that MSC II would no longer 
have qualified for QSub status, even if the Revocation had not 
already occurred.  See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(3)(B) (requiring that a 
QSub be a “domestic corporation”).10  Also, as part of the 
                                              
10
 An LLC may opt to elect to be taxed as a 
partnership, see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c), so the 
conversion of MSC II to an LLC effectively reinstated its 
status as a “flow-through” entity.  But the conversion of MSC 
II, at that time a C-corporation as a result of the Revocation, 
into an LLC may itself  have been a taxable event to the 
extent the conversion could have been treated as a corporate 
liquidation.  See I.R.C. § 336.  The Debtors were aware of the 
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Plan of Reorganization, MSC II ceased to be wholly owned 
by an S-corp, so that, even absent the LLC conversion, and 
independent of the Revocation, MSC II would no longer have 
qualified as a QSub.  The Debtors‟ Plan of Reorganization 
was substantially consummated on December 1, 2011, and 
MSC II emerged from bankruptcy together with the other 
Debtors on that date.  
 
B.  Procedural History 
  
 On December 31, 2010, the Debtors filed an adversary 
complaint in the Bankruptcy Court, asserting that the 
Revocation caused an unlawful postpetition transfer of MSC 
II‟s estate property, in violation of §§ 362 and 549 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The complaint sought recovery of that 
“property” under Code § 550, through an order “directing the 
IRS and [the] Indiana [Department of Revenue] to restore 
BDI‟s status as an S corporation and MSC II‟s status as a 
QSub retroactively effective January 1, 2010.”  (App. at 50.).   
 
 The IRS moved to dismiss the Debtors‟ adversary 
complaint on February 14, 2011, contending that the 
Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction and that the Debtors 
failed to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (incorporated by Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b)).  More particularly, the IRS 
argued that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction under 
Code § 505(a)(1) because the Debtors had not alleged that 
MSC II had actually paid any federal corporate income taxes 
or filed any federal income tax returns prior to initiating their 
                                                                                                     
possible taxable nature of the conversion to an LLC when it 
occurred.     
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adversary proceeding, so that their claims were not ripe.  The 
IRS also argued that the Debtors had failed to state a claim 
because MSC II‟s status as a QSub was not “property” of the 
MSC II estate because MSC II “never had a right to claim, 
continue, or revoke” that status “either before or after it filed 
its bankruptcy petition” (App. at 81), and that no “transfer” of 
estate property occurred when BDI terminated its S-corp 
election and triggered the loss of MSC II‟s QSub status, 
(App. at 83-84).   
 
Barden and BDI answered the Debtors‟ adversary 
complaint on February 28, 2011,  and moved for judgment on 
the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).  
They contended that because a QSub has no separate tax 
existence, MSC II had no cognizable property interest in that 
status.  They also argued that, because a subsidiary‟s QSub 
status depends entirely on elections made by its S-corp 
parent, even if MSC II‟s QSub status were a species of 
property, it was property that belonged to BDI and Barden.   
 
The Debtors moved for summary judgment on 
March 16, 2011, and, on January 24, 2012, the Bankruptcy 
Court granted their motion and denied both the IRS‟s motion 
to dismiss and the Barden Appellants‟ motion for judgment 
on the pleadings.  The Court held that MSC II‟s status as a 
QSub was the property of MSC II, and that, as such, it 
belonged to MSC II‟s bankruptcy estate.  The Court therefore 
concluded that the revocation by non-debtor BDI of its status 
as an S-corp, and the resulting termination of MSC II‟s status 
as a QSub, were void and of no effect.  Finally, the Court 
ordered the defendants, including the IRS, to take all actions 
necessary to restore the status of MSC II as a QSub of BDI. 
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That order, of course, has significant practical 
implications for the parties.  As with many bankruptcy 
reorganizations, the Debtors‟ emergence from bankruptcy 
resulted in the cancellation of a substantial amount of 
indebtedness, which, in turn, generated “cancellation of debt” 
(“COD”) income equal to the amount by which the debt was 
reduced in bankruptcy.  At oral argument before us, the IRS 
said that the amount of that COD income was $170 million.  
COD income is generally subject to federal taxation.  See 
I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (including in the definition of “gross 
income” “income from the discharge of indebtedness”).  If 
BDI is restored to S-corp status, then it, and ultimately 
Barden, is the taxpayer and would be liable for the taxes on 
the COD income.  See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-9, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 20593-01 (Apr. 13, 2011) (providing that, when the 
debtor is a disregarded entity, such as an S-corp, then the 
owner of that entity is the taxpayer).  Normally, under the so-
called “Bankruptcy Exception,” a taxpayer in bankruptcy 
does not recognize COD income on debt that is cancelled or 
written down as part of a plan of reorganization.  I.R.C. 
§ 108(a)(1)(A).  However, in this case, neither Barden nor 
BDI was part of the Majestic bankruptcy, so they may not 
qualify for the Bankruptcy Exception and could be liable for 
the tax on the COD income.  See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-9 
(limiting the Bankruptcy Exception to entities under the 
jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court).  Also, the Bankruptcy 
Court‟s order caused the IRS to lose the benefit of MSC II‟s 
tax liabilities being treated as an administrative expense of the 
bankruptcy estate, which would have allowed the government 
to be paid before most other creditors.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 503(b)(1)(B). 
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By contrast, the Debtors – or, more precisely, their 
former creditors who replaced BDI as the holders of MSC II‟s 
equity – benefit in at least two dramatic ways if the 
Revocation is deemed to have been void or is otherwise 
avoided.  First, if MSC II remains a QSub even after having 
emerged from bankruptcy, then it (and its new equity holders) 
will continue to enjoy its tax-free status, while BDI retains 
liability for MSC II‟s income taxes, even though BDI no 
longer has access to MSC II‟s income and cash flow to fund 
the tax payments.  Second, by shifting the tax liability for 
COD income to BDI, MSC II need not make use of the 
Bankruptcy Exception, which would ordinarily come with a 
substantial cost.  Under the I.R.C., a debtor that makes use of 
the Bankruptcy Exception must reduce the value of other tax 
attributes dollar-for-dollar by the amount of COD income 
excluded from gross income.  See I.R.C. § 108(b)(1).  That 
means that the reorganized debtor loses the value of various 
deductions and credits that would have been available to 
reduce taxes in the future.  See id. § 108(b)(2).  As a 
consequence of the Bankruptcy Court‟s order, however, the 
Debtors avoid liability for COD income without the adverse 
impact on their tax attributes. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court granted the IRS and the Barden 
Appellants leave to appeal on March 7, 2012, even though the 
Court‟s judgment and order had left open the calculation of 
the damages for which Barden and BDI were liable as a result 
of the Court‟s conclusion that they had violated the automatic 
stay.  The United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware certified the appeals to us on May 23, 2012, and we 
authorized the appeals on July 9, 2012.   
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
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The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over the 
adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2), 
1334(a)-(b).  We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).  We reject the Barden 
Appellants‟ argument, raised for the first time in this appeal, 
that the Bankruptcy Court, as an Article I court, lacked 
jurisdiction to order the IRS to reinstate BDI‟s status as an S-
corp and MSC II‟s status as a QSub.  Leaving aside that 
arguments not raised below are normally waived on appeal, 
see In re American Biomaterials Corp., 954 F.2d 919, 927 
(3d Cir. 1992), that argument is without merit.  The 
Bankruptcy Code gives bankruptcy courts the power to 
“„issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out [its] provisions.‟”  Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. 
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 567 (3d Cir. 
2003) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)).  The IRS is subject to 
that power as an “entity” referred to in specific provisions of 
the Code, because that term expressly includes a 
“governmental unit.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(15).  The Court‟s 
ability to exercise jurisdiction over the IRS has been affirmed 
in a number of contexts.  See United States v. Energy Res. 
Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990) (holding that “a bankruptcy 
court has the authority to order the IRS to apply the payments 
[made by a debtor] to trust fund liabilities if the bankruptcy 
court determines that this designation is necessary to the 
success of a reorganization plan”); United States v. Whiting 
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 209 (1983) (concluding that the 
Code authorizes a bankruptcy court to recover property seized 
to satisfy a lien prior to the filing of a petition for 
reorganization, and noting that “[w]e see no reason why a 
different result should obtain when the IRS is the creditor”).  
 18 
 
Transactions to which the IRS is a party are also subject to 
the general rule that they are void if they violate the automatic 
stay.  See United States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114, 124 n.5 
(2004) (noting that the automatic stay barred the IRS from 
bringing suit against a debtor in bankruptcy);  In re Schwartz, 
954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that an IRS tax 
assessment that violated the automatic stay was void). 
 
Although we reject the Barden Appellants‟ argument 
that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction, we note that 
this case raises a jurisdictional question of standing that the 
parties did not raise and the Bankruptcy Court did not 
consider.  We address that question in Parts III.A and III.B, 
infra, in the context of the merits. 
 
When reviewing a bankruptcy court‟s grant of 
summary judgment, “we review the ... findings of fact for 
clear error and exercise plenary review over the ... legal 
determinations.”  In re Kiwi Int’l Air Lines, Inc., 344 F.3d 
311, 316 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing In re Woskob, 305 F.3d 177, 
181 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Cont’l Airlines, 125 F.3d 120, 128 
(3d Cir. 1992)).  A grant of summary judgment is “proper 
only if it appears that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that [each of] the moving part[ies] is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (alterations in original) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In evaluating the evidence, we “view inferences to 
be drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion.”  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 
F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
We exercise plenary review over rulings on motions to 
dismiss, In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. 
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Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 357 (3d Cir. 2012), and over rulings on 
motions for judgments on the pleadings, Rosenau v. Unifund 
Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
This appeal requires us to answer two related 
questions.  As a threshold matter of justiciability, we must 
decide whether the Debtors have standing to challenge the 
revocation of MSC II‟s QSub status.  That, however, requires 
us to address the merits of whether the MSC II bankruptcy 
estate had a property interest in MSC II‟s QSub status such 
that the Debtors had the right to challenge what they 
characterize as the postpetition transfer of that interest. 
 
A. Standing 
 
 Front and center in this case is the question of whether 
a debtor subsidiary‟s entity tax status is “property” at all, and, 
if so, whether it is property belonging to that subsidiary or to 
its non-debtor corporate parent.  That implicates standing, 
even though the issue was not addressed before this appeal.  
Inasmuch as the “[s]tanding doctrine embraces ... judicially 
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction,”  
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), we turn to it first.   
 
The doctrine of standing “focuses on the party seeking 
to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the 
issues he wishes to have adjudicated.”  Valley Forge 
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It 
“involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court 
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jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.”  Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).  One of those prudential 
limits demands that “the plaintiff generally ... assert his own 
legal rights and interests, and []not rest his claim to relief on 
the legal rights or interests of third parties.”  Id. at 499.   
 
The Debtors‟ effort to pursue claims under Code 
§§ 362, 549, and 550 is dependent upon Code § 541, which 
provides that a bankruptcy estate succeeds only to “legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor ... as of the commencement of 
the case.”  11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).  It is a given that “[t]he 
trustee [or debtor-in-possession] can assert no greater rights 
than the debtor himself had on the date the [bankruptcy] case 
was commenced.”  Guinn v. Lines (In re Trans-Lines West, 
Inc.), 203 B.R. 653, 660  (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (quoting 4 
Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 541.06 (15th ed. 1996)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
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As discussed in more detail in Part III.B.1, infra, “a 
corporation cannot alter its tax status through election, 
revocation or rescission, without some form of shareholder 
consent,” so that “the corporation, standing alone, cannot 
challenge the validity of a prior Subchapter S revocation ... 
without the consent of at least those shareholders who 
consented to the revocation.”  Trans-Lines West, 203 B.R. at 
660.  As a result, “[a] trustee [or debtor-in-possession] who 
attempts to challenge the validity of a revocation without such 
consent is asserting the rights of a third party,” i.e., the equity 
holder, and “does not have standing ... .”  Id.; cf. Simon v. E. 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (declining to 
decide “whether a third party ever may challenge IRS 
treatment of another”).  
 
Following that reasoning, if we assume that a 
subsidiary‟s entity tax status, e.g., its existence as a pass-
though entity, is “property” but hold that such status belongs 
not to the subsidiary itself but rather to its parent, then the 
right to challenge the revocation of QSub status belongs 
solely to the parent corporation, and the bankruptcy estate of 
a QSub does not succeed to that right under Code § 541.  If 
that is the case, then a debtor subsidiary that challenges a 
revocation, as MSC II has done in this case, is endeavoring to 
assert the rights of a third party, namely its S-corp parent, 
which is contrary to general principles of standing.      
 
The prohibition on third party standing, however, “is 
not invariable and our jurisprudence recognizes third-party 
standing under certain circumstances.”  Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y 
v. Green Spring Health Servs. Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 288 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  We have recognized that “the principles 
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animating ... prudential [standing] concerns are not subverted 
if the third party is hindered from asserting its own rights and 
shares an identity of interests with the plaintiff.”  Id. (citing 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1976); Singleton v. 
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1976) (plurality opinion); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972)).  “More 
specifically, third-party standing requires the satisfaction of 
three preconditions: 1) the plaintiff must suffer injury; 2) the 
plaintiff and the third party must have a „close relationship‟; 
and 3) the third party must face some obstacles that prevent it 
from pursuing its own claims.”  Id. at 288-89 (citing 
Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 397 (1998); Powers v. 
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991); Pitt. News v. Fisher, 215 
F.3d 354, 362 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
 
If the entity tax status of MSC II is “property” that 
belongs to BDI, then the present case does not satisfy the 
third condition for third-party standing.  Nothing in the record 
suggests that BDI, as the former shareholder of MSC II and 
the “third party” with standing, is unable to protect its own 
interests.  The term “third party” is actually something of a 
misnomer here because BDI, as well as its ultimate 
shareholder Barden, are both defendant parties in the present 
action and have vigorously fought to protect their interests.  
Sticking with that nomenclature, though, it is settled that 
“third parties themselves usually will be the best proponents 
of their own rights,” Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114, and the fact 
that BDI chose not to backtrack and challenge the Revocation 
does not mean that MSC II or the Debtors have standing to do 
so.    
 
We thus find ourselves in a circumstance where what 
is ordinarily the preliminary question of standing cannot be 
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answered without delving into whether the entity tax status of 
MSC II is “property” and, if so, whether it belongs to MSC II.  
In short, we must consider the merits.  
 
B. QSub Status Claimed as “Property” of the MSC 
 II Bankruptcy Estate 
 
Referring to MSC II‟s QSub status, the Bankruptcy 
Court said that “because the debtor-corporation‟s subchapter 
„S‟ status provided the debtor-corporation the ability to pass-
through capital gains tax liabilities to its principals, the right 
to make or revoke its subchapter „S‟ status had value to the 
debtor and constituted property or an interest of the debtor in 
property.”  In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 466 B.R. 666, 
675 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).  The Barden Appellants argue that 
the Bankruptcy Court erred in that conclusion because the 
Court “applied a general overarching bankruptcy principle 
that anything that brings value into a bankruptcy estate must 
be a property right” (Barden Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 21), 
despite the fact that “the Bankruptcy Code by itself ... does 
not constitute a source of property rights” (id. at 18).  
Likewise, the IRS asserts that simply because an S-corp 
election “means that the corporation may „use‟ and „enjoy‟” 
the benefits of a pass-through entity tax status, “it does not 
follow that the postpetition revocation of ... [that] election is a 
transfer of estate property.”  (IRS Opening Br. at 27.)   
 
 In their adversary proceeding, the Debtors sought 
relief under §§ 549, 550, and 362 of the Code.
11
  Section 549 
                                              
11
 Specifically, the Debtors sought “an order voiding 
the Avoidable Transfer under section 549 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, and[,] pursuant to section 550 of the ... Code,” orders 
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provides that a debtor-in-possession or trustee “may avoid a 
transfer of property of the estate that occurs after the 
commencement of the case[] and that is not authorized ... by 
the court.”  11 U.S.C. § 549(a).  Section 550 permits the 
debtor-in-possession or trustee to “recover, for the benefit of 
the estate” property whose transfer has been avoided under § 
549.  Id. § 550(a).  Finally, § 362 provides for an “automatic 
stay” such that the filing of a chapter 11 petition “operates as 
a stay, applicable to all entities,” of, inter alia, “any act to 
obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from 
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.”  
Id. § 362(a)(3).  Section 362 also provides that “an individual 
injured by any willful violation of [the] stay ... shall recover 
actual damages, including costs and attorneys‟ fees, and, in 
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”  
Id. § 362(k)(1). 
 
 Section 362 operates differently than §§ 549 and 550.  
Those latter sections authorize the bankruptcy court to 
“avoid” the violative transfer, but the debtor-in-possession or 
trustee must commence an adversary proceeding.  See Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 7001(1) (requiring that a “proceeding to recover 
money or property” be brought as an “adversary 
proceeding”);  In re Doll & Doll Motor Co., 448 B.R. 107, 
111 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2011) (denying bank‟s motion seeking 
                                                                                                     
directing all of the defendants to return any transferred 
property and directing the IRS and Indiana Department of 
Revenue to return any tax payments made by MSC II as a 
result of the Avoidable Transfer, an order invalidating the 
Revocation, and an order “voiding the Avoidable Transfer 
under section 362(a)(3) ... and section 362(k)(1) of the 
Bankruptcy Code ... .”  (App. at 51.) 
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an order to recover property sold by a Chapter 11 debtor 
because the bank had not filed an adversary proceeding 
against the buyer).  By contrast, a transfer that violates the 
automatic stay is generally considered to be void without any 
action on the part of the debtor.  In re Myers, 491 F.3d 120, 
127 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing In re Siciliano, 13 F.3d 748, 750 
(3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he general principle [is] that any creditor 
action taken in violation of an automatic stay is void ab 
initio.”)).    
 
Notwithstanding that difference, all three sections have 
three elements in common for purposes of the problem before 
us.  For the Revocation to be void under § 362 or avoidable 
under §§ 549 and 550, QSub status must be (1) “property” (2) 
“of the bankruptcy estate” (3) that has been “transferred.”  
Though a lack of any one of those elements is dispositive, we 
choose to consider – in the alternative – only the first two. 
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1. QSub Status as “Property”  
 
Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code defines 
“property of the estate” as “all legal or equitable interests of 
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).  “[W]e have emphasized that Section 
541(a) was intended to sweep broadly to include all kinds of 
property, including tangible or intangible property, [and] 
causes of action[.]”  In re Kane, 628 F.3d 631, 637 (3d Cir. 
2010) (second alteration in original) (quoting Westmoreland 
Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246 F.3d 233, 241 (3d 
Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “[T]he term 
„property‟ has been construed most generously and an interest 
is not outside its reach because it is novel or contingent or 
because enjoyment must be postponed.”  In re Fruehauf 
Trailer Corp., 444 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “It is also well established that the 
mere opportunity to receive an economic benefit in the future 
is property with value under the Bankruptcy Code.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
However, “[f]iling for bankruptcy does not create new 
property rights or value where there previously were none.”  
In re Messina, 687 F.3d 74, 82 (3d Cir. 2012); cf. Butner v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 56 (1979) (noting that the holder 
of a property interest “is afforded in federal bankruptcy court 
the same protection he would have had under state law if no 
bankruptcy had ensued”).  Consequently, “[t]he estate is 
determined at the time of the initial filing of the bankruptcy 
petition ... .”  Kollar v. Miller, 176 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
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This appears to be a matter of deliberate Congressional 
choice.  Although the constitutional authority of Congress to 
establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies 
throughout the United States,” U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 4, 
could, in theory, encompass a statutory framework defining 
property interests for purposes of bankruptcy, “Congress has 
generally left the determination of property rights in the assets 
of a bankrupt‟s estate to state law,” Butner, 440 U.S. at 54; 
see also In re Brannon, 476 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“[W]e generally turn to state law for the determination of 
property rights in the assets of a bankrupt‟s estate.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  However, if “some federal 
interest requires a different result,” Butner, 440 U.S. at 55, 
then property interests may be defined by federal law.  Cf. 
McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 370 (1945) 
(noting that, “[i]n the absence of any controlling federal 
statute,” a creditor may acquire rights to property transferred 
by a debtor “only by virtue of state law”).   
 
Given the importance of federal tax revenues, one 
might assume that the Internal Revenue Code determines 
whether tax status constitutes a property interest of the 
taxpayer, but it does not do so explicitly and the case law is 
not entirely clear.  See Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 57 
(1999) (considering whether “state law is the proper guide to 
... „property‟ or „rights to property‟” under a provision of the 
I.R.C. and noting that the Court‟s “decisions in point have not 
been phrased so meticulously”).   On one hand, the I.R.C. 
“creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, 
federally defined, to rights created under state law.”  United 
States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958).  Thus, “[i]n the 
application of a federal revenue act, state law controls in 
determining the nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer 
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had in the property.”  United States v. Nat’l Bank of 
Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722 (1985) (quoting Aquilino v. 
United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  On the other hand, “[o]nce it has been 
determined that state law creates sufficient interests in the 
[taxpayer] to satisfy the requirements of [the federal revenue 
statute], state law is inoperative, and the tax consequences 
thenceforth are dictated by federal law.”  Id. (second 
alteration in original)  (quoting Bess, 357 U.S. at 56-57) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In Drye v. United States, 
the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that “the [I.R.C.] and 
interpretive case law place under federal, not state, control the 
ultimate issue whether a taxpayer has a beneficial interest in 
any property subject to levy for unpaid federal taxes.”  528 
U.S. at 57.  Also, the I.R.C. does address the handling of tax 
attributes in the bankruptcy context, at least when “the debtor 
is an individual,” see I.R.C. § 1398(a), and provides that the 
“[e]state succeeds to tax attributes of [the] debtor ... 
determined as of the first day of the debtor‟s taxable year in 
which the case commences ... .”  I.R.C. § 1398(g); see also 
United States v. Sims (In re Feiler), 218 F.3d 948, 953 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (“I.R.C. § 1398 determines what tax attributes of 
the debtor rightfully belong to the bankruptcy estate ... .”).  
The Bankruptcy Code itself defers to the I.R.C. with respect 
to the creation and character of certain tax attributes of the 
bankruptcy estate.  See 11 U.S.C. § 346(a) (providing that the 
I.R.C. governs whether the creation of a bankruptcy estate 
creates a tax entity separate from the debtor).  Thus, we 
conclude that the I.R.C., rather than state law, governs the 
characterization of entity tax status as a property interest for 
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.  
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With this background, we review the case law that the 
Debtors say supports their claim that MSC II‟s QSub status 
was “property.” 
 
i. S-Corp Status as “Property” 
 
The Bankruptcy Court reasoned that QSub status is 
analogous to S-corp status and, based on a few cases holding 
that the latter is “property” for purposes of the Code, 
concluded that the former is “property” too.  The principal 
case is In re Trans-Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. 653 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. 1996), which concerned whether a corporation‟s 
revocation of its S-corp status prior to filing for bankruptcy 
was a prepetition transfer of property avoidable by the trustee 
pursuant to Code § 548.
12
  The bankruptcy court in that case 
acknowledged that, “[i]n the absence of controlling federal 
law, the question of whether a debtor possesses an interest in 
property is governed by state law,” but the court reasoned 
that, “[b]ecause the subject of the alleged transfer is the 
Debtor‟s status as a Subchapter S corporation, a status created 
under title 26 of the United States Code, ... federal law, and 
more specifically the Internal Revenue Code,” determines 
whether a debtor holds a property interest in its S-corp status.  
203 B.R. at 661.
13
  The court observed that “„property‟ refers 
                                              
12
 Section 548 provides, in relevant part, that “the 
trustee may avoid any transfer ... of an interest of the debtor 
in property, or any obligation ... incurred by the debtor, that 
was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of 
the filing of the petition ... .”  11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). 
13
 Courts that have followed Trans-Lines West have 
reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Parker v. Saunders (In 
re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.), 226 B.R. 227, 233 (B.A.P. 9th 
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... to the right and interest or domination rightfully obtained 
over [an] object, with the unrestricted right to its use, 
enjoyment, and disposition.”  Id. (quoting 63A Am. Jur. 2d 
Property §1 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It 
then jumped to the conclusion that, 
once a corporation elects to be treated as an S 
corporation, I.R.C. § 1362(c) guarantees and 
protects the corporation‟s right to use and enjoy 
that status until it is terminated under I.R.C. 
§ 1362(d). Moreover, § 1362(d)(1)(A) provides 
that “[a]n election under subsection (a) may be 
terminated by revocation.” I.R.C. 
§ 1362(d)(1)(A) ... . Thus, I.R.C. 
§ 1362(d)(1)(A) guarantees and protects an S 
corporation‟s right to dispose of that status at 
will. 
 
Id. (first alteration in original). 
 
The court also noted that I.R.C. § 1362(c) provides 
that an S-corp election “shall be effective ... for all succeeding 
taxable years of the corporation, until such election is 
terminated,” id. at 661-62 (internal quotation marks omitted), 
and it reasoned that the I.R.C. thus “affords a corporation 
which has elected the Subchapter S status a guaranteed, 
indefinite right to use, enjoy, and dispose of that status,” id. at 
661.  From that, the court concluded that “the Debtor 
possessed a property interest (i.e., a guaranteed right to use, 
enjoy and dispose of that interest) in its Subchapter S status ... 
                                                                                                     
Cir. 1998) (“[A] debtor‟s subchapter S status is a creation of 
I.R.C. § 1362, and federal law therefore determines whether a 
debtor holds a „property‟ interest in its subchapter S status.”). 
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.”  Id. at 662.  Other courts that have considered the issue of 
S-corp status as a property right have all come to the same 
conclusion.  See Halverson v. Funaro (In re Funaro), 263 
B.R. 892, 898 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001) (“[A] corporation‟s right 
to use, benefit from, or revoke its Subchapter S status falls 
within the broad definition of property [under the Code].”); 
Parker v. Saunders (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.), 226 B.R. 
227, 234 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the holding 
in Trans-Lines West “is consistent with the Ninth Circuit‟s 
definition of property”); Hanrahan v. Walterman (In re 
Walterman Implement Inc.), Bankr. No. 05-07284, 2006 WL 
1562401, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa May 22, 2006) (“[T]he 
right to revoke [a] Subchapter S election is property ... as 
defined in § 541[] ... [and] the revocation of Debtor‟s 
subchapter S status is also voidable under § 549 as a 
postpetition transfer.”).     
 
The Trans-Lines West decision and those that follow it 
base their conclusion that S-corp status is “property” on a 
series of precedents holding net operating losses (“NOLs”) to 
be property.
14
  In Segal v. Rochelle, the Supreme Court 
                                              
14
 Net operating losses    
are created when the taxpayer‟s deductible 
business expenses for a given year exceed her 
net income for that year. [I.R.C.] § 172(c). Once 
NOLs are sustained, the taxpayer may carry the 
loss back three years and use it as a deduction in 
that year.  NOLs that remain are applied to the 
next two years and deducted accordingly. Id. 
§ 172(b)(1)(A), (b)(2).  If any loss remains at 
the end of the three-year carryback period, it is 
carried forward and deducted from the 
 32 
 
declared that the right to offset NOLs against past income (a 
“loss carryback”) is property of an individual debtor, because 
it entitles the debtor to a refund of taxes already paid.  382 
U.S. at 380-81.  The Court decided that a debtor‟s NOLs, 
because they arise from prior losses, are “sufficiently rooted 
in [its] pre-bankruptcy past” that, when carried back to 
generate a tax refund, they “should be regarded as „property‟ 
under [the Code].”  Id. at 380.   
 
Subsequent cases extended the holding in Segal to the 
right to use NOLs to offset future tax liability (a “loss 
carryforward”).  For example, in Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors v. PSS Steamship Co. (In re Prudential 
Lines, Inc.), 928 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1991),
15
 a corporate 
                                                                                                     
taxpayer‟s income over the next fifteen years 
(or until it is exhausted), beginning with the 
year after the loss was initially sustained. Id. 
§ 172(b)(1)(B). Alternatively, the Tax Code 
permits the taxpayer to forego the carryback 
option and instead use the NOLs exclusively in 
future years. Id. § 172(b)(3)(C).  Such an 
election, once made, is irrevocable for that tax 
year.  Id. 
Gibson v. United States (In re Russell), 927 F.2d 413, 415 
(8th Cir. 1991).  An NOL “carryback” against past earnings 
therefore generates a claim for a refund of taxes paid on those 
earnings, while an NOL “carryforward” represents the ability 
to shelter future income from taxation.    
15
 Although Prudential Lines and cases that followed it 
extended Segal‟s holding, the Segal Court expressly reserved 
judgment on whether future tax benefits, such as loss 
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subsidiary had $74 million of NOLs attributable to its past 
operations when an involuntary petition for reorganization 
under Chapter 11 was filed against it.  Its corporate parent 
attempted to take a $39 million “worthless stock” deduction, 
based on the anticipated loss of its investment in the 
subsidiary, which would have eliminated the value of its NOL 
for future use, but creditors of the subsidiary sued the parent 
                                                                                                     
“carryforwards”  (or “carryovers”)  would also constitute 
bankruptcy estate property.   The Court observed that “a 
carryover into post-bankruptcy years can be distinguished 
both conceptually as well as practically” from a benefit 
available against past taxes because “the supposed loss-
carryover would still need to be matched in some future year 
by earnings, earnings that might never eventuate at all.”  
Segal, 382 U.S. at 381.  Despite that dictum, the court in 
Prudential Lines concluded that “[t]he fact that the right to 
a[n] NOL carryforward is intangible and has not yet been 
reduced to a tax refund ... does not exclude it from the 
definition of property of the estate.”  928 F.2d at 572.  That 
conclusion relied on the Segal Court‟s reasoning that 
“postponed enjoyment does not disqualify an interest as 
„property,‟” and that “contingency in the abstract is no bar” to 
finding that an interest is property of a bankruptcy estate.  382 
U.S. at 380.  But that reasoning in Segal was addressed only 
to the argument that an NOL carryback was not property of 
the estate at the commencement of the proceeding because 
“no refund could be claimed from the Government until the 
end of the year” of filing, during which “earnings by the 
bankrupt ... might diminish or eliminate the loss-carryback 
refund claim ... .”  Id.  It does not support the broad 
proposition that any contingent tax attribute can necessarily 
be labeled as “property.” 
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to enjoin it from doing so.  The bankruptcy court held that the 
NOL carryforward was property of the subsidiary‟s 
bankruptcy estate and that the parent‟s planned tax deduction 
would violate the automatic stay.  The court thus granted the 
injunction.  In re Prudential Lines Inc., 114 B.R. 27, 32 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the “right to 
carryforward [the] $74 million NOL to offset future income is 
property of the [subsidiary‟s] estate within the meaning of 
§ 541.” 928 F.2d at 571.  Accord In re Feiler, 218 F.3d at 
955-56 (holding that a prepetition election to carry forward 
NOLs, making them unavailable to the debtor to claim a 
refund of past taxes, constituted a preference payment 
avoidable under the Code);  Gibson v. United States (In re 
Russell), 927 F.2d 413, 417-18 (8th Cir. 1991) (same).  The 
Second Circuit also held that the non-debtor parent‟s 
proposed worthless stock deduction was barred by the 
automatic stay because, “where a non-debtor‟s action with 
respect to an interest that is intertwined with that of a 
bankrupt debtor would have the legal effect of diminishing or 
eliminating property of the bankrupt estate, such action is 
barred by the automatic stay.”  Prudential Lines, 928 F.2d at 
574.
16
 
                                              
16
  We have not yet addressed the question of whether 
NOL carrybacks or carryforwards constitute property.  The 
closest we have come to deciding the question was an issue 
arising under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., rather than the 
I.R.C.  In In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 444 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 
2006), a debtor made an irrevocable election to increase 
pension benefits that denied the bankruptcy estate the ability 
to recoup an accumulated surplus in plan assets.  We held that 
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Trans-Lines West and the decisions that follow it 
extended Prudential Lines, saying that the ability to make an 
S-corp election, like the ability to elect whether to carry 
forward or carry back NOLs, is property.  We think that 
extension untenable, though, for several reasons.
17
  First, in 
                                                                                                     
“[t]his recoupment right is a transferable property interest” 
because,“[a]lthough the right to recover [the surplus from an 
ERISA-qualified retirement plan] is a future estate, the 
reversion itself is a present, vested estate.  As a result, the 
employer‟s reversionary interest falls within the broad reach 
of section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and is considered 
property ... .” Id. at 211 (second alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (“Property of 
the estate includes all interests, such as ... contingent interests 
and future interests, whether or not transferable by the 
debtor.” (quoting Prudential Lines, 928 F.2d at 572) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
17
 We are not the only ones to find the Trans-Lines 
West line of cases wanting.  See James S. Eustice & Joel D. 
Kuntz, Federal Income Taxation of S Corporations ¶ 5.08[1] 
(4th ed. 2001) (“These cases seem like little more than hard 
bankruptcy cases making bad tax law.”); Camilla Berit 
Galesi, Shareholders’ Rights Regarding Termination of a 
Debtor Corporation’s S Status in a Bankruptcy Setting, 10 J. 
Bankr. L. & Prac. 157, 161-62 (2001) (“[D]ue to the [Trans-
Lines West] court‟s misunderstanding of the rules governing 
S election and termination[] ... the court adopts an erroneous 
conception of the nature of a corporation‟s interest in its S 
status.”); Richard A. Shaw, Taxing Shareholders on the 
Income of an S Corporation in Bankruptcy, 1 No. 6 Bus. 
Entities 40, 1999 WL 1419055, at *46 (1999) (“In its haste to 
provide cash for creditors, the Ninth Circuit BAP in 
 36 
 
applying the NOL-as-property principle, which had been 
extended once already by Prudential Lines, see supra note 15, 
the decision in Trans-Lines West and the other S-corp-as-
property cases fail to consider important differences between 
the two putative property interests.
18
  In holding that tax 
status is property, the S-corp cases reason from the premise 
                                                                                                     
Bakersfield [Westar] and the Tennessee Bankruptcy Court in 
... Trans-Lines West ... are simply creating a windfall for the 
bankruptcy estate at the expense of third parties who are not 
in the bankruptcy proceeding.”); id. (“The NOL cases are 
somewhat easier to accept ... [but] [t]he case for disrespecting 
the revocation of an S election is, in many ways, much more 
troublesome.”). 
18
 The reasoning of the “NOL-as-property” cases is 
itself not without flaws.  Those cases looked, in part, to 
Congressional intent that “property of the estate” be 
construed to “include[] all interests, such as ... contingent and 
future interests.”  Prudential Lines, 928 F.2d at 572 (quoting 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 176 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6136) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Feiler, 218 F.3d at 956-57 (quoting same and 
suggesting that “Congress affirmatively adopted the Segal 
holding when it enacted the present Bankruptcy Code”).  But 
Code § 541 contains no reference to “contingent” or “future” 
interests and refers only to “legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”  11 
U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (emphasis added).  Moreover, “the crucial 
analytical key [is] not ... an abstract articulation of the 
statute‟s purpose, but ... an analysis of the nature of the asset 
involved in light of those principles.”  Kokoszka v. Belford, 
417 U.S. 642, 646 (1974).    
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that the “prospective ... nature [of a right] does not place it 
outside the definition of „property.‟”  Bakersfield Westar, 226 
B.R. at 234.  Even accepting that this will sometimes be the 
case, not all contingencies are of equal magnitude or 
consequence.  NOLs when carried back are hardly contingent 
at all.  In all events, a debtor in possession of NOLs has a 
defined amount of them at the time of the bankruptcy filing; 
they are a function of the debtor‟s operations prior to 
bankruptcy and are not subject either to revocation by the 
shareholders or termination by the IRS.  See Segal, 382 U.S. 
at 381 (noting that “[t]he bankrupts in this case had both prior 
net income and a[n] [NOL] when their petitions were filed”);  
Prudential Lines, 928 F.2d at 571 (noting that the subsidiary 
had “a $74 million NOL attributable to its pre-bankruptcy 
operation” when it filed for Chapter 11 reorganization).   By 
contrast, the shareholders of an S-corp can terminate its pass-
through status at will, regardless of how long it has been an S-
corp and whatever its pre-bankruptcy operating history has 
been.  The tax status of the entity is entirely contingent on the 
will of the shareholders.   
 
NOLs also have value in a way that S-corp status does 
not.  The value of an NOL is readily determinable as a tax 
refund immediately available to the bankruptcy estate to the 
extent that it is applied to prior years‟ earnings, and it is still 
subject to relatively clear estimation if the debtor decides to 
carry it forward against future earnings.  The value of the S-
corp election, however, is dependent on its not being revoked, 
as well as the amount and timing of future earnings.  
Moreover, NOL carryforwards may be monetized in a manner 
that continuing S-corp status cannot.  A corporation that does 
not expect to generate sufficient future earnings to use its 
NOLs may be purchased by another more profitable 
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corporation which may then use the NOLs to shelter its own 
income, a transaction expressly contemplated by the I.R.C.  
See I.R.C. § 382 (setting forth certain limitations on the use of 
NOL carryforwards after a change in the corporation‟s 
ownership).  By contrast, the sale of an S-corp will generally 
result in the termination of its tax-free status.  See I.R.C. 
§ 1361(b)(1) (setting forth the requirements for “small 
business corporation” status and providing that the sale of an 
S-corp to most corporate purchasers would terminate its “S” 
status).   Thus, the analogy of S-corp status to NOLs is of 
limited validity. 
 
A further flaw in the S-corp-as-property cases is that 
they presume that “once a corporation elects to be treated as 
an S corporation, [the I.R.C.] guarantees and protects the 
corporation‟s right to use and enjoy that status ... [and] 
guarantees and protects an S corporation‟s right to dispose of 
that status at will.”19  Trans-Lines West, 203 B.R. at 662.  
That reflects an incomplete and inaccurate understanding of 
the law.  The I.R.C. does not, and cannot, guarantee a 
corporation‟s right to S-corp status, because the corporation‟s 
shareholders may elect to revoke that status “at will.”  See 
I.R.C. § 1362(d)(1)(B) (providing for termination of S-corp 
status by revocation with the approval of shareholders 
holding more than one-half the corporation‟s shares).  Even if 
the shareholders do not vote to revoke their corporation‟s S-
corp status, any individual shareholder may at any time sell 
his interest – without hindrance by the Code or the I.R.C. – to 
another corporation, or to a nonresident alien, or to a number 
                                              
19
 To speak of the revocation as a “disposition,” as 
Trans-Lines West does, is to assume that the tax status is a 
property interest, which is exactly the issue in contention.  
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of new individuals sufficient to increase the total number of 
shareholders to more than 100.
20
  Any of those sales would 
trigger the automatic revocation of the company‟s S status 
because the corporation would no longer qualify as a “small 
business corporation.”  See I.R.C. § 1361(a)(1), (b)(1).  Thus, 
the Trans-Line West line of cases is incorrect in concluding 
that S-corp status is a “right” that is “guaranteed” under the 
I.R.C.
21
    
 
                                              
20
 There may, of course, be contractual agreements 
among the shareholders limiting the alienability of shares. 
21
 Our holding in Fruehauf Trailer, see supra note 16, 
is not to the contrary.  In that case, we held that a corporate 
debtor‟s right to recoup an accumulated surplus in its pension 
plan was property, even though the plan trustee had the right 
to make an irrevocable election under ERISA to increase 
pension benefits, denying the debtor the benefit of that 
surplus.  See 444 F.3d at 211 (noting that property may be 
“contingent” and that “the mere opportunity to receive an 
economic benefit in the future is property with value under 
the Bankruptcy Code” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
But in that case the debtor had a contractual right to recover 
the surplus, which we found to be a “future estate, [in which] 
the reversion itself is a present, vested estate,” and one that 
was “transferable and alienable.”  Id.  As a result, we held 
that the debtor‟s “reversionary interest falls within the broad 
reach of section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and is 
considered property of the debtor‟s estate.”  Id.  An S-corp 
has no such contractual or otherwise “reversionary” interest 
in its tax status, let alone one that is “transferable and 
alienable.”    
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Perhaps recognizing those flaws, some courts holding 
that S-corp status is “property” have defaulted to the 
argument that such status must be property because it has 
value to the estate.  See Prudential Lines, 928 F.2d at 573 
(“[W]e must consider the purposes animating the Bankruptcy 
Code ... [and] Congress‟ intention to bring anything of value 
that the debtors have into the estate.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Bakersfield Westar, 226 B.R. at 234 (“The 
ability to not pay taxes has a value to the debtor-corporation 
in this case.”).  Indeed, the Bankruptcy Court in this case 
essentially defined the Debtors‟ property interest as “the right 
to prevent a shifting of tax liability from the shareholders to 
the QSub through a revocation of the „S‟ corporation‟s 
status.”  Majestic Star Casino, 466 B.R. at 678.  But § 541 
defines property only in terms of “legal or equitable interests 
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
case.”  11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).  It goes without saying that the 
“right” of a debtor to place its tax liabilities on a non-debtor 
may turn out to have some value, but that does not mean that 
such a right, if it exists, is property.  Capacious as the 
definition of “property” may be in the bankruptcy context, we 
are convinced that it does not extend so far as to override 
rights statutorily granted to shareholders to control the tax 
status of the entity they own.  “[T]he Code‟s property 
definition is not without limitations ... .”  Westmoreland, 246 
F.3d at 256.  Even accepting that an interest that is “novel or 
contingent” may still represent property under the Code, 
Segal, 382 U.S. at 379, a tax classification over which the 
debtor has no control is not a “legal or equitable interest[] of 
the debtor in property” for purposes of § 541.   
 
Finally, aside from their flawed reasoning, Trans-Lines 
West and its progeny (and the Bankruptcy Court‟s decision in 
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this case) also produce substantial inequities.  Taxes are 
typically borne and paid by those who derive some benefit 
from the income. Cf. I.R.C. § 1 (imposing taxes on “the 
taxable income” of the parties listed in that section).  As the 
IRS observes in its brief, “[i]n the typical case where an S 
corporation or Q-sub receives income, the shareholder has the 
ability to extract the income from the corporation in order to 
pay the taxes due on that income.”  (IRS Opening Br. at 29.)  
See also supra notes 2 and 4 (discussing the “flow-through” 
nature of S-corps).  If a bankruptcy trustee is permitted to 
avoid the termination of a debtor‟s S-corp or QSub status, 
then any income generated during or as part of the 
reorganization process  (such as from the sale of assets) is 
likely to remain in the corporation, and ultimately in the 
hands of creditors, but the resulting tax liability must be borne 
by the S-corp shareholders.  The Trans-Lines West decision, 
despite its flaws, clearly recognized that unfairness: 
 
The Trustee‟s successful challenge of the 
Debtor‟s revocation of its Subchapter S status in 
the present case would have dire tax 
consequences to the non-consenting 
shareholder. Upon the Trustee‟s sale of the 
Debtor‟s real estate, the liability for any capital 
gain would be passed on to the shareholder. 
Conversely, in its present C corporation status, 
the Debtor‟s estate will be liable for the capital 
gains tax. 
 
203 B.R. at 660 n.9.  Trans-Lines West treated that 
inequitable outcome as indicating a problem with the 
bankruptcy trustee‟s standing to challenge the transfer of a 
supposed property interest in a debtor‟s S-corp status without 
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the consent of the company‟s shareholders.  Id. at 660.  That 
bit of Trans-Lines West is true enough.  But the inequity also 
calls into question the soundness of the court‟s holding that 
an entity‟s tax status is property in the first place.  “Under the 
scheme contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor‟s 
creditors are typically compensated to the extent possible and 
in as equitable a fashion as possible ... after the trustee 
marshals the debtor‟s bankruptcy property ... .”  
Westmoreland, 246 F.3d 251.  It would be impossible for a 
trustee (or a debtor-in-possession) to “marshal” a debtor‟s S-
corp status and use it to compensate creditors, as that status is 
not controlled by the debtor and has no realizable value.   
 
For all these reasons, we decline to follow the rationale 
of Trans-Line West and its progeny, and we conclude that S-
corp status is not “property” within the meaning of the Code.   
 
ii. MSC II’s QSub Status as  
 “Property” 
 
QSub status is an a fortiori case.  As with S-corp 
status, the I.R.C. does not (and cannot) guarantee a QSub “the 
unrestricted right to [the] use, enjoyment and disposition” of 
that status, see Trans Lines West, 203 B.R. at 661, because it 
depends on a variety of factors that are entirely outside the 
QSub‟s control.  The QSub has an even weaker claim to the 
control of its status than does an S-corp.  The use and 
enjoyment of its entity tax status is not only dependent on its 
S-corp parent‟s continuing to own 100 percent of its stock, 
see I.R.C. § 1361(b)(3)(B)(i), (b)(3)(C)(i), but also on the 
parent‟s decision to not revoke the QSub election, see id. 
§ 1361(b)(3)(B)(ii), as well as the parent‟s continuing status 
as an S-corp, see id. § 1361(b)(3)(B)(i).  That last 
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contingency, in turn, depends on the S-corp contingencies 
already discussed.
22
  Therefore, a QSub‟s use and enjoyment 
of its tax status may be terminated by factors not only outside 
its control, but outside the control of its S-corp parent. 
 
Nor can the QSub transfer or otherwise dispose of its 
QSub status.  “As a practical matter,” rights to which a debtor 
asserts a property interest “must be readily alienable and 
assignable,” Westmoreland, 246 F.3d at 250, to fulfill the 
equitable purpose of bankruptcy, which is to generate funds 
to satisfy creditors.  See id. at 251 (holding that a license for 
which few entities other than the debtor would qualify was 
not a property interest of a bankruptcy estate because it is 
“dubious, as a practical matter, that any potential buyers 
would actually bid for that right”).  QSub status itself is 
neither alienable nor assignable, and an S-corp that wishes to 
sell its QSub and preserve its tax status can only sell it to 
another S-corp that is willing to purchase 100 percent of its 
shares and to make the QSub election.  See I.R.C. 
§ 1361(b)(3)(B) (setting forth the requirements for QSub 
status).  The subsidiary would no longer qualify as a QSub 
after any other type of sale, and the I.R.C. expressly provides 
for the loss of QSub status as a result of a sale of the 
subsidiary‟s stock.  See id. § 1361(b)(3)(C)(ii).  Thus, a QSub 
can hardly be said to control the disposition of the alleged 
property interest in its entity status.  Again, a tax 
classification over which a debtor has no control and that is 
not alienable or assignable is not a “legal or equitable 
interest[] of the debtor in property.”  11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).  
                                              
22
 See supra note 2.  The S-corp parent‟s contingencies 
include preservation of its own S-corp election which, as 
discussed above, is controlled by its shareholders.  
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We therefore hold that MSC II‟s QSub status was not 
“property” and that the Bankruptcy Court‟s contrary 
conclusion was error. 
 
2. QSub Status as Property of the Estate  
 
Even if QSub status were property, it would still have 
to be property “of the estate” for a transfer of that status to be 
void under Code § 362 or avoidable under § 549.  The Code 
defines “property of the estate” as “all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of 
the case.”23  11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (emphasis added).  
Notwithstanding “Congress‟ intention to bring anything of 
value that the debtors have into the estate,” Prudential Lines, 
928 F.2d at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted), the 
legislative history of § 541 also demonstrates that it was “not 
intended to expand debtor‟s rights against others more than 
they exist at the commencement of the case.”  S. Rep. 95-989, 
at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868; see 
also 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 541.06 (15th ed. 1996)) 
(“Although [§ 541(a)(1)] includes choses in action and claims 
by the debtor against others, it is not intended to expand the 
debtor‟s rights against others beyond what rights existed at 
the commencement of the case. ... The trustee can assert no 
greater rights than the debtor himself had on the date the case 
was commenced.”). 
 
As discussed above, whether a tax attribute is property 
of a corporate entity for purposes of  Code § 541 is a function 
                                              
23
 The terms “property of debtor” and “interests of the 
debtor in property” are co-extensive for purposes of 
§ 541(a)(1).  Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 59 n.3 (1990).  
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of the I.R.C. and related regulations.  Even if it were proper to 
think of S-corp status in terms of “ownership,” the ownership 
question would rightly be decided by considering the S-corp‟s 
“flow-through” treatment for tax purposes.  See supra note 4.  
For example, an NOL may belong to a debtor that is a “C” 
corporation, such as in Prudential Lines, or to an individual 
debtor, as in Feiler and Russell, because “when [a] C 
corporation and/or ... individuals file[] for bankruptcy, the 
estate created contain[s] all of their assets[,] [and] [i]ncluded 
therein [are] their tax attributes, including NOLs.”  Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Forman Enters., Inc. v. 
Forman (In re Forman Enters., Inc.), 281 B.R. 600, 612 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2002).  However, when an S-corp files for 
bankruptcy, its estate cannot contain any NOLs because 
“[u]nder the provisions of the [I.R.C.] ... , the NOL and the 
right to use it automatically passed through by operation of 
law to [the] ... S corporation shareholders.”  Id.   “Any tax 
benefits resulting from the NOL and the right to use it inure 
solely to the benefit of ... shareholders and would not be 
available to satisfy claims of the corporation‟s creditors.”  Id.   
 
The same can be said of an S-corp‟s entity tax status 
itself.  The S-corp debtor is merely a “conduit” for tax 
benefits that flow through to shareholders.  The corporation 
retains no real benefit from its tax-free status in that, while 
there is no entity-level tax, all of its pre-tax income is passed 
on to its shareholders.  See I.R.C. § 1363(a) (providing that an 
S-corp is a disregarded entity for federal tax purposes and is 
not taxed on its income); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
558, 576 n.14 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (noting that the 
shareholders of an S-corp receive their individual shares of 
the corporation‟s income, deductions, losses, and tax credits). 
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For its part, a QSub does not even exist for federal tax 
purposes.  If an S-corp makes a valid QSub election with 
respect to an existing subsidiary, the subsidiary is deemed to 
have liquidated into the parent under I.R.C. §§ 332 and 337.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-4(a)(2).
24
  As a result, a QSub is 
generally not treated as a corporation separate from its S-corp  
parent.  Id. § 1.1361-4(a)(1).
25
  If a subsidiary ceases to 
qualify as a QSub – because, for example, its corporate parent 
is no longer an S-corp – the subsidiary is treated as a new 
corporation acquiring all of its assets (and assuming all of its 
liabilities) from the parent S-corp immediately before 
termination, in exchange for stock of the new subsidiary 
corporation, under I.R.C. § 351.  I.R.C. § 1361(b)(3)(C); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-5(b).  Lastly, a QSub that loses its QSub 
status cannot return to that status for five years, at which time 
a new QSub election by the parent S-corp is required.  I.R.C. 
§ 1361(b)(3)(D); Treas Reg. § 1.1361-5(c)(1).  Pertinent 
                                              
24
 That is what happened in this case; MSC II was 
incorporated in 2005, and BDI made the QSub election in 
2006.   
25
 The Debtors argue that a QSub‟s separate existence 
“is respected for a number of ... purposes, including various 
tax purposes as set forth in the U.S. Treasury regulations.”  
(Debtors‟ Br. in Resp. to Barden Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 
23.)  However, the purposes they cite for which a QSub‟s 
separate existence is respected (for taxes due on pre-QSub 
income, employment and excise taxes, and the obligation to 
file information returns, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-4(a)(6)-
(a)(9)) are the narrow exceptions to the general rule that a 
QSub has no independent status under the I.R.C., see id. 
§ 1.1361-4(a)(1)(i). 
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regulations thus strongly suggest that a QSub‟s tax status is 
not “owned” by the QSub.   
 
If QSub status were property at all, it would be 
property of the subsidiary‟s S-corp parent.  Because “[t]he 
desirability of a Subchapter S election depends on the 
individual tax considerations of each shareholder[,] [t]he final 
determination of whether there is to be an election should be 
made by those who would suffer the tax consequences of it.”  
Kean v. Comm’r, 469 F.2d 1183, 1187 (9th Cir. 1972).  
Trans-Lines West was correct in that regard.  It acknowledged 
that “[a] corporation‟s election and revocation of the S 
corporation status under I.R.C. § 1362 is shareholder driven,” 
and “[a]lthough the corporation is the sole entity that makes 
the election or revocation under I.R.C. § 1362, both acts are 
contingent upon various degrees of consent by the 
corporation‟s shareholders.”  203 B.R. at 660 (citing I.R.C. 
§ 1362(a)(2), (d)(1)(B)).    
 
Moreover, allowing QSub status to be treated as the 
property of the debtor subsidiary rather than the non-debtor 
parent, as the Bankruptcy Court did in this case, places 
remarkable restrictions on the rights of the parent, restrictions 
that have no foundation in either the I.R.C. or the Code.  First, 
the corporate parent loses not only the statutory right to 
terminate its subsidiary‟s QSub election, see I.R.C. 
§ 1361(b)(3)(B), (D), but also its right to terminate its own S-
corp election, see id. § 1361(d).  Second, the corporate parent 
loses the ability to sell the subsidiary‟s shares to any 
purchaser other than an S-corp, and would then be required to 
sell 100 percent of the shares, because any other sale would 
trigger the loss of the subsidiary‟s QSub status.  See id.  
§ 1361(b)(3)(B).  Third, the S-corp parent and its 
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shareholders lose the ability to sell the parent to a C-
corporation, partnership, or other non-S-corp entity, to a non-
resident alien, or to more than 100 shareholders, because any 
of those transactions would also trigger the loss of the 
subsidiary‟s QSub status.  See id. § 1361(b)(1)(B), (C), (A).  
Filing a bankruptcy petition is not supposed to “expand or 
change a debtor‟s interest in an asset; it merely changes the 
party who holds that interest.”  In re Saunders, 969 F.2d 591, 
593 (7th Cir. 1992).  But under the Bankruptcy Court‟s 
holding in this case, a QSub in bankruptcy can stymie 
legitimate transactions of its parent as unauthorized transfers 
of property of the estate, even though the QSub would have 
had no right to interfere with any of those transactions prior to 
filing for bankruptcy.
26
 
                                              
26
  For similar reasons, we question whether the relief 
that the Bankruptcy Court granted was permissible or 
appropriate.  Code § 550, which authorizes relief for transfers 
avoided pursuant to § 549, places several limitations on the 
scope of that relief.  First, the trustee may only recover “the 
property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of 
such property.”  11 U.S.C. § 550(a).  Therefore, “only net 
amounts diverted from, that is damages consequently suffered 
by the creditor body of, a debtor may be recovered” pursuant 
to § 550.  In re Foxmeyer Corp., 296 B.R. 327, 342 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2003) (considering a claim under Code § 548).  
Second, “[t]he trustee is entitled to only a single satisfaction” 
under § 550.  11 U.S.C. §550(d); see also HBE Leasing Corp. 
v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 640 (2d Cir. 1995) (prohibiting an 
“unjustified double recovery” in an avoidance action); In re 
Skywalkers, Inc., 49 F.3d 546, 549 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying 
the “single satisfaction” rule to a debtor‟s recovery of both a 
liquor license and the payments made to procure that license).  
 49 
 
                                                                                                     
Third, a debtor may avoid transfers and recover transferred 
property or its value only if the recovery is “for the benefit of 
the estate.”  In re Messina, 687 F.3d 74, 82-83 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citing 11 U.S.C. §550(a)).  A debtor is not entitled to benefit 
from any avoidance, id., and “courts have limited a debtor‟s 
exercise of avoidance powers to circumstances in which such 
actions would in fact benefit the creditors, not the debtors 
themselves,” In re Cybergenics Corp., 226 F.3d 237, 244 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  Because “the rule is that the estate is dissolved 
upon confirmation of the plan, ... there is no post-
confirmation bankruptcy estate … to be benefitted,” and 
property recovered as a result of an avoidance action after a 
plan has been confirmed may represent an impermissible 
benefit to the reorganized debtor.  Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 
39 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Code § 1141).  For 
that reason, some courts have required a specific mechanism 
whereby the prepetition creditors, rather than the reorganized 
debtor, receive the benefit of a post-confirmation avoidance 
and recovery of transferred property.  See In re Kroh Bros. 
Dev. Co., 100 B.R. 487, 498 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) 
(authorizing relief pursuant to which creditors would receive 
at least one half of preference recoveries);  In re Jet Fla. Sys., 
Inc., 73 B.R. 552, 556 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (authorizing 
relief pursuant to which creditors would receive 80 percent of 
the proceeds of preference actions).   
The remedy fashioned here by the Bankruptcy Court 
runs afoul of such limitations.  The Bankruptcy Court held 
that “[t]he revocation of Defendant [BDI‟s] status as a 
subchapter „S‟ corporation and the termination of MSC II‟s 
status as a qualified subchapter „S‟ subsidiary are void and of 
no effect” and ordered that “[t]he Defendants shall take all 
actions necessary to restore the status of Debtor [MSC II] as a 
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qualified subchapter „S‟ subsidiary of Defendant [BDI].”  
Majestic Star Casino, 466 B.R. at 679-80.  However, MSC II 
had already emerged from bankruptcy and was no longer a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of BDI.  That meant that MSC II 
“recovered” not only its transferred “property” – its tax-free 
status that was subject to BDI‟s claim on 100 percent of its 
income – but also its ability to retain all of its pre-tax 
earnings.  That represented a double recovery and then some.  
Likewise, because the relief ordered by the Bankruptcy Court 
was of indefinite duration, it would continue to benefit MSC 
II long after its creditors had been compensated and sold their 
interests, thus impermissibly benefitting MSC II itself as the 
former debtor. 
Relief under § 362 admittedly is not subject to the 
limitations of § 550 because a transfer that violates the 
automatic stay is void ab initio.  Siciliano, 13 F.3d at 749.  
Nevertheless, under § 362, in order to define the relief due as 
a result of a void transfer, it is still necessary to identify the 
postpetition transfer that violated the stay.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(a)(3).  The Bankruptcy Court failed to do that, and 
simply treated the revocations at both BDI and MSC II as 
void.  But those revocations were themselves irrevocable, see 
I.R.C. §§ 1361(b)(3)(D), 1362(g); Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-
5(c)(1), and the Court‟s treatment of them as simply void 
raises a question of whether § 362 “could, under the tax laws 
of the United States, be utilized to undo previously executed 
acts.”  Forman, 281 B.R. at 612.         
Finally, MSC II no longer qualified as a QSub after the 
Majestic Plan was confirmed both because it was owned by 
its former creditors rather than being wholly-owned by an S-
corp, see I.R.C. § 1361(b)(3)(B)(i), and because those 
creditors had converted it to an LLC, see id. § 1361(b)(3)(B) 
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The Debtors argue that “the manner in which an S-
corp or QSub obtains or maintains its status is not 
determinative” of who holds the property right. (Debtors‟ Br. 
in Resp. to Barden Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 26).  They say 
that “the proper focus is on the fact that, under the Internal 
Revenue Code, the corporation possesses and enjoys the 
benefits that result from such status at the time of its chapter 
11 petition.”  (Id.)  In support of that contention, they cite In 
re Atlantic Business & Community Corp., 901 F.2d 325 (3d 
Cir. 1990), for the proposition that “mere possession of 
property at the time of filing suffices to give an interest in 
property protected by section 362(a)(3).”  (Id. at 26-27 
(quoting Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp., 901 F.2d at 328) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).)   
 
There are two problems with that argument.  First, the 
holding in Atlantic Business & Community Corp. was, by its 
own terms, limited to possessory interests in real property.  
See 901 F.2d at 328 (holding that “a possessory interest in 
real property is within the ambit of the estate in bankruptcy 
under Section 541”); id. (“[W]e hold that a debtor‟s 
possession of a tenancy at sufferance creates a property 
interest as defined under Section 541, and is protected by 
Section 362 ... .”).  The case does not support the broad 
principle that any interest that “benefits” the debtor or that 
                                                                                                     
(requiring that a QSub be a “domestic corporation”).  
Therefore, treating the revocation of MSC II‟s QSub status as 
void pursuant to Code § 362 left that entity in violation of at 
least those two I.R.C. provisions.  “Humpty Dumpty could 
not be restructured using this scenario.”  Forman, 281 B.R. at 
612.   
 
 52 
 
“the corporation possesses and enjoys” (Debtors‟ Br. at 26) is 
necessarily property of the estate rather than property of a 
non-debtor.  Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (limiting property of 
the estate to “legal or equitable interests of the debtor”).  
Second, the QSub‟s S-corp parent – and the parent‟s ultimate 
shareholders – have at least as strong an argument that they 
possess and enjoy the benefits that result from the 
subsidiary‟s QSub status due to the pass-through of income, 
the pass-through of losses which may be used to shelter other 
income, and the elimination of entity-level tax at the QSub.     
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, even if 
MSC II‟s QSub status were “property,” it is not properly seen 
as property of MSC II‟s bankruptcy estate, and the contrary 
conclusion of the Bankruptcy Court cannot stand.
27
   
                                              
27
 We also doubt that, even if MSC II‟s QSub status 
were property of its bankruptcy estate, the Revocation would 
constitute a transfer for purposes of Code §§ 549 and 550.  
The Code defines a “transfer” as, inter alia, “each mode, 
direct or indirect, absolute or unconditional, voluntary or 
involuntary, of disposing or parting with ... property[] or an 
interest in property.”  11 U.S.C. 101(54)(D) (numbering 
omitted).  “Congress intended this definition to be as broad as 
possible.”  Russell, 927 F.2d at 418.  However, both §§ 549 
and 550 presume that a “transfer” requires that there be a 
“transferee” that receives the property interest conveyed from 
the debtor.  See 11 U.S.C. § 549(b) (providing that the trustee 
has avoidance powers “notwithstanding any notice or 
knowledge of the case that the transferee has”); id. 
§ 550(a)(2) (providing for the recovery of value from “any 
immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee”).  
There are only two candidates for transferee in this case – 
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C. Standing Revisited 
 
Having determined that a debtor‟s QSub status is not 
property of its bankruptcy estate, we return to the question of 
whether such a debtor has standing to challenge the 
revocation of that status by its corporate parent.   As 
discussed in Part III.A, supra, an S-corp, “standing alone, 
cannot challenge the validity of a prior Subchapter S 
revocation without the consent of at least those shareholders 
who consented to the revocation.”  Trans-Lines West, 203 
B.R. at 660.  “A trustee [or debtor-in-possession] who 
attempts to challenge the validity of [such] a revocation 
without such consent is asserting the rights of a third party,” 
i.e., its shareholders, and “does not have standing ... .”  Id.  
By analogy, a debtor QSub that seeks to challenge the 
revocation of its tax status is asserting the rights of a third 
party, its S-corp shareholder, and can do so only if it can 
claim third-party standing.  That, in turn, requires that the 
QSub plaintiff demonstrate both that its S-corp parent “is 
hindered from asserting its own rights and shares an identity 
                                                                                                     
Barden and BDI – and neither can be said to have been the 
“transferee” of MSC II‟s QSub status or of its “right” not to 
pay taxes on its income.  The Revocation was itself triggered 
by BDI‟s revocation of its S-corp status, so that, far from 
enjoying a transfer of MSC II‟s tax-free status, BDI itself 
became a taxpayer.  Likewise, Barden did not somehow 
become an S-corp or a QSub as a result of the revocations at 
BDI and MSC II.  The transfer envisioned by the Bankruptcy 
Court thus seems very far removed from the definition set 
forth in 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) and suggested by the concept of 
a “transferee” as that term is used in §§ 549 and 550. 
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of interests with the plaintiff.”  Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y, 280 
F.3d at 288.     
 
Neither of those conditions exists in this case.  Far 
from being “hindered,” BDI and its ultimate shareholder 
Barden are both parties to this suit and have effectively 
defended BDI‟s right to revoke its own S-corp status and, by 
extension, the QSub status of MSC II.  And far from having 
an “identity of interests,” the interests of  MSC II and the 
other Debtors are diametrically opposed to those of Barden 
and BDI, onto whom they would like to shift substantial on-
going tax liabilities.  “The extent of potential conflicts of 
interests between the plaintiff and the third party whose rights 
are asserted matters a good deal.”  Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 
742, 750 (3d Cir. 1991).  “While it may be that standing need 
not be denied because of a slight, essentially theoretical 
conflict of interest, ... genuine conflicts strongly counsel 
against third party standing.”  Id.  We therefore hold that the 
Debtors lacked standing to initiate an adversary proceeding to 
seek avoidance of the alleged “transfer” of MSC II‟s QSub 
status.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Sections 362, 549, and 550 of the Code set forth 
guidelines to determine whether a voidable transfer of estate 
property has occurred.  The Bankruptcy Court‟s decision, like 
the S-corp-as-property cases on which it relied, was based in 
part on the conclusion that “a broad range of property 
[should] be included in the estate,” due to the “Congressional 
goal of encouraging reorganizations and Congress‟ choice of 
methods to protect secured creditors.”  Majestic Star Casino, 
466 B.R. at 673.  But, as the Supreme Court recently 
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observed, “nothing in the generalized statutory purpose of 
protecting secured creditors can overcome the specific 
manner of that protection which the text [of the Code] 
contains.”  RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated 
Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012).   
 
Given that principle, and for the reasons set forth in 
this opinion, we will vacate the Bankruptcy Court‟s 
January 24, 2012 order and remand this matter with directions 
to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 
